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What does it mean to be 'in one's right mind'? Ordinary discourse and the technical languages of the social sciences assume that being in one's right mind essentially means that one has the ability to calculate how to attain valued ends while avoiding injury and opprobrium i . The calculating rationality which utilizes appropriate means to achieve desired ends is thought to be known and recognized both by rational subjects themselves and by equally rational observers; irrationality, then, is an incapacity to calculate, and is revealed in a lack of congruence between acts and goals. However, although the range of goals and methods for achieving them has been greatly expanded by an awareness of cultural context, the interpretive approach does not really offer any significant challenge to the model of rationality outlined above, but rather remains grounded in standard utilitarian assumptions of rational individual actors calculating means to achieve valued ends. In this paper, I
argue that a truly radical challenge to the notion of rationality already exists within the canon of Western social thought in the works of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim, as well as in the now forgotten writings of crowd psychologists Gustave Le Bon and Gabriel Tarde.
In the next few pages, I will outline these oppositional and radically non-calculative aspects of social theory, contrast them with the work of some influential modern scholars, and, by means of a discussion of typical recruitment mechanisms found in some 'New Age' movements, suggest a few ways these classic perspectives might help us to rethink our notions of person, agent, and sanity.
Max Weber and the Irrational
It is appropriate to begin with Max Weber, who is the predominant figure in the pantheon of modern American sociology and anthropology. For Weber and his orthodox followers sociology and anthropology were defined as the effort to reveal sympathetically yet systematically the significance of social action through exposing the cultural values and norms that motivate persons. This is the famous method of verstehen, or, in Geertzian terms, 'taking the native's point of view', and is the foundation of interpretive anthropology. From this perspective, the interpreter reaches 'understanding' by realizing the meanings the local actor attaches to his or her actions in pursuit of culturally valued goals. In other words, Weberian and Geertzian actors are reasonable, although their reasons may not be immediately transparent to an uninitiated observer due to cultural and historical differences in valuesystems and in the modes of rationality developed as a consequence of these differences.
We can see then that Weberian sociology and its modern interpretive descendants are approaches to social science that fit in well with the model of 'standard' consciousness I outlined above: human beings are assumed to be rational agents acting consciously and intelligently to maximize their valued goals; their thought is recognizable as reasonable by the thinker as well as by the culturally knowledgeable observer; furthermore, rationality is highly valued within its particular cultural setting, since only rational action can lead to attainment of culturally desirable ends. The contribution of interpretive social science, in the Weberian and Geertzian sense, is thus to reveal the rationality of apparent irrationality through supplying "the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby... a causal explanation of its course and consequences" (Weber 1978: 4) . For Weber, this approach, in which the point of view of the other is taken in order to display the underlying intent and purpose of social action for that other is the sole mode of inquiry proper to the social sciences. According to Weber, such a limitation of the possibilities of sociology is necessary because sociologists (and, by extension, anthropologists) are products and purveyors of rational analytic thought and can only practise their craft in this mode. Even more crucial, however, is Weber's fundamental contention that any action orientation in which the actors' motives and goals are not self-consciously determined is outside the realm of meaning, therefore unintelligible, and as such must be excluded from the central interpretive task of social theory.
But although Weber specifically excludes all irrational, unconscious, and purely reactive activity from the realm of theory and accordingly devotes himself to explicating the types of rationality that 'make sense' of other cultures and historical epochs, he himself was well aware that a great deal of human life -indeed, most of human life -is not experienced by self-conscious agents acting for achieving valued goals within coherent 'webs of meaning'. Weber therefore breaks action orientations down into four ideal types ii . Two of these types -value rationality and instrumental rationality -are different forms of calculating consciousness based upon the rationality of the actor iii and in most of his major writing Weber elaborates their distinctions and evolution. The other two types of action orientation, however, are deemed by Weber to be without any purpose or meaning whatsoever, and thereby to stand outside the range of social theory.
These types are tradition and charisma
Tradition is defined by Weber as "on the other side" of the borderline between meaningful and irrational action (Weber 1978: 25) , since for him tradition ideally implies an automatic and unthinking repetition by the actor enmeshed within the confines of a mindless swarm; it is a state of torpor, lethargy and inertia, predictable and mechanical, reproducing itself in utter indifference and submerging the creative individualities of all persons caught within its coils iv . Here, Weber gives us a picture of mundane life governed by routine; a world of the passive crowd in which rational self-consciousness and goalorientation has no part to play.
Yet, although tradition is sociologically unanalyzable in principle, Weber nonetheless notes that action motivated by habit and thoughtless conformity is hardly unusual. Instead, he
writes that "in the great majority of cases actual action goes on in a state of inarticulate half-consciousness or actual that the "bulk of all everyday action" is motivated by "an almost automatic reaction to habitual stimuli" (Weber 1978: 25) .
Weber freely acknowledges such "merely reactive imitation may well have a degree of sociological importance at least equal to that of the type which can be called social action in the strict sense" (Weber 1978: 24) .
Of even greater importance is charisma, which stands in absolute contrast to tradition. In its simplest form, charisma is defined by Weber as "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is considered extraordinary and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities" (Weber 1978: 242 (Weber 1972 (Weber : 327, 1978 vi . Through his capacity for epileptoid states, the shaman served both as an exemplar of ecstasy and as the leader in the rituals of communal intoxication and orgy Weber took as the original sacred experience (Weber 1978: 401, 539) .
Why should such manifestations of apparent abnormality appeal to an audience? It is not intuitively obvious that a display of epileptoid behavior would be attractive to anyone; in our society quite the contrary is the case. But Weber postulated that extreme emotional states, such as those generated in seizures and other forms of emotionally heightened altered states of consciousness, had a contagious effect, spreading through the audience and infecting its members with corresponding sensations of enhanced emotionality and vitality; these expansive sensation are felt to be emanating from the stimulating individual, who is then attributed with superhuman powers vii . The charismatic appeal therefore lies precisely in the capacity of a person to display heightened emotionality and in the reciprocal capacity of the audience to imitation and corresponding sensations of altered awareness.
Thus for Weber, what is essential and compulsive in the charismatic relation is not its meaning, though explanatory meaning systems will certainly be generated after the fact viii .
Rather, it is the participatory communion engendered by the epileptoid performance of the charismatic which experientially and immediately releases the onlookers from their mundane sufferings. "For the devout the sacred value, first and above all, has been a psychological state in the here and now.
Primarily this state consists in the emotional attitude per se;" an attitude in which the following could momentarily escape from themselves by dissolving in "the objectless acosmism of love" (Weber 1972: 278, 330 follows that "the charismatic propensity is a function of the need for order" (Shils 1965:203) But these are only a part of Durkheim's sociology. In contrast to the Weberian concern with conscious agents struggling to achieve culturally mediated goals and values, Durkheim founded his sociology on the notion that ordinary consciousness is characterized more by rationalization than by rationality. For him, the reasons people claim to have for what they are doing and the meanings they attribute to their actions are post facto attempts to explain socially generated compulsions which they actually neither understand nor control.
Thus Durkheim, unlike Weber, draws a radical distinction between the goals and character of the group and the goals and characters of the individuals within the group, arguing that "social psychology has its own laws that are not those of individual psychology " (1966: 312) . Furthermore, "the interests of the whole are not necessarily the interests of the part" (Durkheim 1973: 163) ; indeed, they may be, and often are, completely at odds. But the group imposes its own will upon the hearts and minds of its members and compels them to act in ways that run against their own subjective interests; these actions are later rationalized to 'make sense', and the rationalizations then become the value systems of a particular human society.
Durkheim therefore presents us with the extraordinary proposal that sociology cannot take as its subject the individual person who is manipulating within culture to maximize his or her own ends. Rather, he proposes a continuous conflictual ebb and flow between singularity and community, self and group xv . As he writes, "our inner life has something like a double center of gravity. On the one hand is our individuality -and, more particularly, our body in which it is based; on the other it is everything in us that expresses something other than Influenced by studies of Mesmerism xviii and the same notions of emotional excitability that Weber also utilized, Durkheim thought that an extraordinary altered state of consciousness among individuals in a group, which he called 'collective effervescence' would occur spontaneously "whenever people are put into closer and more active relations with one another" (Durkheim 1965: 240-1) . This experience is one of depersonalization, and of a transcendent sense of participation in something larger and more powerful than themselves xix .
Durkheim, ordinarily a placid writer, paints a potent picture of this state, as the personal ego momentarily disintegrates under the influence of the fevered crowd. "The passions released are of such an impetuosity that they can be restrained by nothing.... Everything is just as though he really were transported into a special world, entirely different from the old one where he ordinarily lives, and into an environment filled with exceptionally intense forces that take hold of him and metamorphose him" (Durkheim 1965: 246, 249 Canetti's words, as a 'crowd crystal' around whom the collective can solidify and resonate (Canetti 1978) xx . The result of this solidification is immediate imitation, magnified through the lens of the leader and synchronized within the group as a whole.
In a feedback loop, this echoing and magnifying serves to further heighten emotion, leading to greater challenges to the ego and more potent feelings of exaltation. After this ecstatic experience "men really are more confident because they feel themselves stronger: and they really are stronger, because forces which were languishing are now reawakened in the consciousness" (Durkheim 1965: 387) .
The physical experience of self-loss and intoxication in the crowd's collective effervescence is, for Durkheim, the "very type of sacred thing" (Durkheim 1965: 140) and is the ultimate and permanent source of social cohesion; all else is secondary.
Thus he writes that what is necessary for social life "is that men are assembled, that sentiments are felt in common and expressed in common acts; but the particular nature of these sentiments and acts is something relatively secondary and contingent" (1965: 431-2).
Tradition, from this perspective, is not seen as a torpid counter to the excitement of charisma, as in the Weberian model. In this formulation, the 'standard' state of rational consciousness, which Le Bon and Tarde both quite explicitly took to be the consciousness of a masculine, calculating, utilitarian free agent, was fragile indeed. Indeed, though lauding rationality as the highest form of thought, the crowd psychologists, like Weber, were suspicious of the extent to which rational consciousness actually prevailed. Tarde, for example, believed that people, though imagining themselves to be free agents acting for understood goals, are in truth "unconscious puppets whose strings were pulled by their ancestors or political leaders or prophets " (1903:77) . From this perspective, men and women, insofar as they are members of a group, are "in a special state, which much resembles the state of fascination in which the hypnotized individual finds himself in the hands of the hypnotiser" (Le Bon 1952: 31) .
In this vision, even the most rational individual ran great risk of being quickly and irresistibly reduced to the lowest common denominator when immersed in a crowd, and consequently of acting in a savage, childish, 'feminine' and, in short, irrational manner that would never be condoned by ordinary standards of behavior. Rational consciousness, then, is portrayed and appreciated by these thinkers as a feeble refuge from the torrents of passion and destruction that seethe within the collective; a torrent that drowns all who are drawn into its vortex xxii . The Durkheimian view of the power of the collective is here completely accepted, but this power is allowed only a negative moral content, while the good is found solely in the flimsy boat of rationality.
For the crowd psychologists, as for Durkheim, the mechanisms that stimulate the crowd are simple. Once a mass is gathered, any strong action excites immediate imitation and magnification in a cycle of intensification that eventually dies down, much like the ripples that appear after a stone is thrown into a pool. Only through such stimulation can human beings attain "the illusion of will" (Tarde 1903:77) xxiii . So, where
Durkheim believed the primal group would coalesce spontaneously without the necessity of any external excitement, crowd psychology argued that someone had to throw the stone and provide the "dream of command" that stimulates the crowd to unite in pursuit of "a dream of action" (Tarde 1903: 77) .
In postulating the need for a leader to galvanize the group, Le Bon and Tarde 118). The crowd psychologists argue that it is precisely the leader's obsessive self-absorption that appeals to the crowd, since only through feeling himself pulled and formed by forces beyond his control does the leader gain the power to act and thereby break the cycle of imitation and passivity that has held the collective in a somnambulistic stupor xxv .
In the paradigm offered by crowd psychology, such persons elicit not only obedience, but also the love and adulation of the followers. By standing apart, completely focused on an inner vision which compels and energizes them, they embody and exemplify the "dream of command" that electrifies the following.
So we have the paradox of a leader who, far from wishing to further the ends of his followers, instead "in perfect egotism offered himself to (their) adoration" (Tarde 1903: 203) . The crowd psychologists thus come to the pessimistic conclusion that the group's devotion has "never been bestowed on easy-going As Le Bon prophetically writes, as a consequence of the erosion of traditional bonds of kinship, ethnicity and religion that kept the regression to mass consciousness at bay, "the age we are about to enter will in truth be the ERA OF CROWDS" (1952:14) .
The Denial of Charisma
In so demonizing the altered states of charisma and group participation, crowd psychology prefigures the modern attitude, though unlike modern writers, the crowd psychologists retained a fearful appreciation of the potency of group consciousness.
But this appreciation has been repressed by the efforts by In the pragmatic, cheerful 'once born' ethos, the desire for personal enlightenment is reconciled with practical action, doing well in the office becomes a pathway to self-fulfillment, and accepting hierarchy is understood not only as a useful strategy in business, but also as a spiritual exercise, since In keeping with the practical, work-oriented manifest content of this ideology, most participants have little involvement in any particular spiritual technology, judging efficacy, like any good consumer, solely by perceived results.
They are, in Bird's (1979) terminology, apprentices rather than devotees or disciples; persons merely looking for helpful knowledge in a complicated mystic marketplace.
Yet, despite their overtly instrumental character, utilitarian orientation, and constantly shifting peripheral membership, these groups paradoxically appear to have a strong tendency to develop highly committed charismatized inner cores of intensely loyal devotees gathered around a leader taken to be a demigod. As Roy Wallis puts it, "social reality outside the movement may come to seem a pale and worthless reflection of the social reality of the movement.... (as) the self and personal identity... become subordinated to the will and personality of the leader" (Wallis 1984: 122-24) .
In Scientology, for instance, there was a "transformation from a loose, almost anarchic group of enthusiasts of a lay psychotherapy, Dianetics, to a tightly controlled and rigorously disciplined following for a quasi-religious movement, Scientology" (Wallis 1977:5) . L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of this group, began as a science fiction writer and entrepreneur, but ended by claiming to be a Messiah "wearing the boots of the moment" (Kaufman 1972: 25, 179) . Any questioning showed one was not moving toward 'clear', whereas meditation on Hubbard's often self-contradictory words was considered to be transformative in itself.
In the fully formed Scientology corporation a multi-million dollar enterprise was headed by a small, secretive, highly disciplined and fully committed central cadre, the Sea Org, marked by their esoteric practices, special language, and distinctive uniforms of white, with black boots and belt.
Totally dedicated to Hubbard, they formed an inner circle of virtuosi living in seclusion aboard Hubbard's yacht, proclaiming their devotion by signing 'billion year contracts' of spiritual service to their eternal leader.
As the group made claims to have the key, not simply to enhanced awareness, but to all the world's problems, it also became more rigid and totalitarian; fear of 'suppressives' (Scientology language for opponents) heightened, leading to expensive lawsuits and countersuits; meanwhile Hubbard himself withdrew deeper into paranoia, eventually isolating himself so that only three people were actually permitted to see him, and it became a matter of controversy whether he was alive or dead xxxi .
Est has followed a similar trajectory. Beginning as the revelation of a former encyclopedia salesman and ex-Scientology convert, est brought together the techniques of Scientology, Buddhist meditation, existential philosophy and group therapy to form a potent self-help organization which soon began to exhibit a charismatic character. Werner Erhard, the founder, was idolized by his committed followers as a "fully realized human being" who "lives in risk and possibility... we catch up with him, then he moves ten steps ahead" (a convert quoted in Singh 1987: 89 ). An inner circle of devotees controlling the vast est empire were absolutely loyal to Erhard, whom they conceived to be a savior. This inner circle was tightly knit, strictly regulated, and required to have only "those purposes, desires, objectives, and intentions that Werner agreed for you to have" Est never utilized such a literal image of liberation as Scientology's Thetan, but very similar techniques were in operation in the recruitment and training process. For est, as in Scientology, history and family are considered to be destructively enmeshing, and the point of training is to be released "from the cultural trance, the systematic selfdelusion, to which most of us surrender our aliveness" (Marsh 1975: 38) . The process is conceived as awakening to one's timeless and vital transpersonal essence, thus becoming "truly able and perfect" (an est trainer, quoted in Tipton 1982: 177).
As in Scientology, trainees cannot break through into this perfect realm by reason; reason is regarded as a defense against the intrinsic and immediate truth of intuitive feeling states.
"If you experience it, it's the truth. The same thing believed is a lie" (Erhard, quoted in Tipton 1982: 192) .
As in Scientology, instruction is geared to break down the students' reasoning power and 'conditioning' through The individual participating in this experience is likely to attribute his or her feelings of expansion to the doctrine and the leader. The 'perfect self' that is then revealed when personal identity is stripped away is, more often than not, a self modeled after the charismatic group exemplar. A new identity then replaces that which has been abandoned as inauthentic -an identity legitimated by the intensity of the emotion generated in the altered state of consciousness of the ecstatic group context -but one which, in consequence, can only exist within this extraordinary situation xxxvii . In other words, despite appearances of pragmatism, the world-affirming group is likely to develop into a node of collective effervescence that stands in opposition to the larger rationalized social organization, which is experienced as 'dead' and alienating. The next step is to try to make the world replicate the group; this is the road toward Messianism and paranoia.
Conclusion
Two points are especially worth reiterating here. The first is the repeated use of techniques aimed at demonstrating that the recruit is not an autonomous individual, but rather is 'programmed' and 'conditioned' by history, culture, and family.
This revelation, engendered in a highly charged group context under the authority of an apparently powerful authority figure, is crucial in stimulating the emotional abreaction that helps lead the subject into collective participation. It is, it seems to me, an anthropological fact of considerable importance that 
Endnotes:
i I am not claiming that Westerners only have positive evaluations of instrumental rationality; 'sincere' emotion is also highly valued. However, sincere feelings do not come from the mind, but from the heart. ii The 'ideal type' is a formal conceptual model to be used as a lens for viewing variations in real social configurations in order to make comparisons. This implies that 'rational' social formations are in actual fact never fully rational, but always have 'traditional' and 'charismatic' elements within them, even though these elements may be suppressed or denied. And, of course, the reverse is also the case. For more on Weber's methodology, see Weber 1949. iii Instrumental rationality -the rationality typical of modernity and capitalism -is characterized by the most efficient use of means to reach an end. Value rationality -the rationality of premodern societies -envisions means as ends, with efficiency taking second place to proper modes of behavior. The complexities and ambiguities of this distinction are many, and the boundaries of the categories are by no means clear, but what is relevant here is simply that both types of social action, whatever their differences and similarities, involve conscious choices and acts aimed at maximizing valued goals. iv Interestingly, Weber foresaw just such a hive-like future for rational man.
Utmost rational efficiency will lead, he feared, to a rigid and immobile bureaucratic and technocratic social system. v See Weber 1978 : 242, 400-3, 535-6, 554, 1112 , 1115 . 1972 for the relationship between charismatic revelation and ecstatic states of excitement.
vi The conjunction between epilepsy and charisma seems odd given our modern medical conception of grand-mal and petit-mal epileptic seizures as electrical storms in the brain that eliminate consciousness while causing gross motor convulsions. But Weber's model (one common to his era) broadly imagined epileptic -or, more properly, epileptoid -seizures as closely akin to hypnotic states and to hysterical fits (see Thornton 1976, Massey and McHenry 1986 for more on this connection). Our modern counterpart might be the category of dissociation.
However, it is also worth noting that Winkelman (1986) , among others, has argued for a parallel between shamanic dissociation, temporal lobe epilepsy, and other forms of what Sacks (1985) has called mental superabundances, or disorders of excess, in which sensations of energy and vitality become morbid, and illness presents itself as euphoria.
An example is Dostoyevsky, who writes, "You all, healthy people, can't imagine the happiness which we epileptics feel during the second before our fit... I don't know if this felicity lasts for seconds, hours or months, but believe me, I would not exchange it for all the joys that life may bring!" (quoted in Sacks 1985: 137) .
We might also recall that cross-cultural studies of shamanism do in fact show strong incidence of overtly epileptoid manifestations such as trembling and convulsions, especially in the early stages of shamanic initiation. Evidently there may be both a predisposition and an element of imitation and training at work in achieving shamanic trance, and the trance itself may have a considerable overlap with some mild forms of disturbance of the temporal lobe. vii "Ecstasy was also produced by the provocation of hysterical or epileptoid seizures among those with predispositions toward such paroxysms, which in turn produced orgiastic states in others" (Weber 1978: 535) . viii Characteristically, Weber's own intellectual concern is with typologizing and contextualizing the novel ethical meaning systems provoked by the prophet's revelations. He notes that the prophet himself may believe the new meaning system is his major contribution. But Weber clearly states that for the masses, and especially for the impoverished, the prophet remains a charismatic with transcendent powers; the commitment of these followers is not to ideas, but to the prophet's person and his promise of immediate experiential salvation (Weber 1978: 467, 487) . ix Levi-Strauss (1967) takes a similar position, but with a very different analytical point.
x "Under the technical and social conditions of rational culture, an imitation of the life of Buddha, Jesus, or Francis seems condemned to failure for purely external reasons" (Weber 1972:357) . xi See Greenfeld (1985) for a good statement of the distinction between primary and secondary charisma; though she too assumes as the essential driving force an orientation for building meaning. xii As Harriet Whitehead writes, "cultural anthropology has chosen the conservative route of merely noting that religious practices seem to have some intensifying or disordering effect upon experience, and retreating back into the realm of culturally organized meaning manipulation " (1987: 105) . In Weberian terms, this 'retreat' has an 'elective affinity' for intellectuals, because it is founded on an assertion of the absolute value and importance of the scholarly professional faith in the primacy of reason and the possibility of approaching meaning through interpretation. xiii Weber profoundly regretted his own incapacity to experience the compulsion of charisma, he lamented the decline of the ecstatic, and he longed for the advent of "entirely new prophets" who would bring, through their very presence, an escape from "the iron cage" of rational action without transcendent content that he envisioned as the inevitable and unhappy future of humanity (Weber 1958:181-2) . xiv See, for example, Meeker, who portrays Durkheim as believing "science would eventually prove fully adequate as a replacement for religion " (1990: 62) , and who castigates him for his supposed dismissal of "human dreams and wishes" in favor of the apotheosis of an abstract emblem. Meeker here ignores Durkheim's emphasis on passion and desire in the construction of the elementary forms of religious life. xv "We do not admit that there is a precise point at which the individual comes to an end and the social realm commences.... we pass without interval from one order of facts to the other" (Durkheim 1966: 313) . xvi In taking this perspective, Durkheim prefigures Freud, but with an entirely reversed moral viewpoint. And, of course, the influence of Rousseau and the Comptean vision of a revolutionary sociology are very strong indeed in Durkheim's apotheosis of society. xvii Durkheim argues in an important footnote that the realm of the economy, where the maximizing rational individual holds sway, is the only arena of social life that is in essence completely opposed to the sacred. The dominance of the economy in modern culture is therefore destructive of the moral bonds of society (1965: 466) . Note how different his project is from Weber's, who aimed to show the ways in which various prophecies favor or oppose the rise of capitalism. xviii As Moscovici writes, the hypnotic state was envisioned in late 19th century French culture as "that strange drug which... releases the individual from his solitude and carries him off to a world of collective intoxication" (1985: 92) . As already noted, hypnotism and epilepsy were thought to be similar in nature. The idea and experience of hypnotism and allied dissociated states was a romantic counter to Utilitarian individualism, and had a strong influence on social and psychological thought, as well as literature and the arts, in the late 19th and early 20th century. xix The similarity to Weber's 'objectless acosmism of love'is evident. xx For this reason, Durkheim can make the seemingly paradoxical claim that "despotism is nothing more than inverted communism " (1984: 144) . xxi This image continues to prevail in medical theories of 'mass hysteria'.
See Bartholomew (in press) for a compendium of examples. Bartholomew's paper is also an example of the interpretive attempt to validate all apparently irrational action by demonstrating its meaningfulness and intent within a cultural context. xxii The tropes of the 'feminine', 'savage', 'childish' crowd are painfully clear indicators of the anxiety felt by these men over a possible loss of control and over the weakness of their masculine, civilized, adult personnas. An interesting, if obvious, analysis could be made of these metaphors, which relate to the changing political climate of France and heightened fear of lower class rebellion. What I wish to stress here, however, is the structure of the argument. xxiii Awareness makes no difference to this existential condition. "If the photographic plate became conscious at a given moment of what was happening to it, would the nature of the phenomenon be essentially changed" (Tarde: xiv)? xxiv As Tarde writes, "volition, together with emotion and conviction, is the most contagious of psychological states. An energetic and authoritative man wields an irresistible power over feeble natures. He gives them the direction which they lack. Obedience to him is not a duty, but a need…. Whatever the master willed, they will; whatever the apostle believes or has believed, they believe" (1903: 198) . xxv Although the leader's appeal is irrational, it has certain pattern, and Le Bon gained much of his fame as a modern Machiavelli, telling rulers how to hold the reins of power in the new Age of the Crowd through the use of emotionally charged theatricality, large gestures, dramatic illusions and the rhetoric of myth. According to Le Bon, the modern leader's technique must be "to exaggerate, to affirm, to resort to repetitions, and never attempt to prove anything by reasoning" (Le Bon 1952: 51) . Le Bon's instructions have been taken seriously by many demagogues, including Hitler, who cited him extensively in Mein Kampf.
xxvi Those who believe that Nazi devotees and leaders were motivated by either value or instrumental rationality should consider work by Robert Waite (1977) and Ian Kershaw (1987) , as well as Joachim Fest's biography of Hitler (1974) , and the numerous biographies of dedicated Nazis. For more on this, see Lindholm 1990: 93-116 . xxvii The intellectual debt of much contemporary anthropological theory to existential and phenomenological thought cannot be adequately pursued here, but particularly noteworthy is an emphasis on 'authenticity' and a refusal to make comparisons -both derived from premises of the priority of a unique inner self-consciousness struggling to free itself from what Heidegger (1962) called the tyranny of 'the they.' The Western character of these premises is, I hope, evident. xxviii See Lindholm (1990) for a theoretical framework, and for analysis of more extreme cases of modern charisma: Nazism, the Manson Family, and Jim Jones's Peoples Temple. xxix The term is used by Roy Wallis to distinguish these positive movements from apocalyptic and millennial 'world rejecting' movements such as Jonestown (Wallis 1984) . xxx The material is taken from sources which rely both on the testimony of converts and of those who have 'deconverted'. On the question of the moral stance of the informant, and its influence on the data, see the Appendix in Wallis (1984) . Here, I have used material that is corroborated by sources both within and without the movements. xxxi Hubbard was officially reported dead in 1986, but he had not been seen in public for many years, and may have died sometime previously (see Lamont 1986 for an account). The difficulty of maintaining a charismatic organization after the death of the leader is probably one cause of the reluctance to admit his death. xxxii Erhard has subsequently resigned some of his positions of authority in the organization. xxxiii These methods have been substantially altered as each organization moves through the cycle of charismatic routinization and then again attempts to restimulate fervor among the disciples. The examples used here date from the most expansive and charismatic phase of this process. xxxiv See Bainbridge and Stark (1980) , who argue that the lack of any real content in 'clear' status and the constantly shifting Scientology doctrine actually enhanced Scientology's hold over its converts. xxxv Erhard, a postmodernist before his time, has commented that "there are only two things in the world, semantics and nothing" (quoted in Martin 1980: 114) . xxxvi I should note that of course not all participants prove to be equally susceptible to the lure of the group. Innumerable differences in personal and cultural background and circumstances will make a difference in the degree to which any individual will be likely to participate. But under the right conditions, it is also very possible that even the most resistant individual might be caught up in the compelling dynamic of a charismatic collective. xxxvii Bainbridge (1978) has called this process "social implosion," that is, the development of a tight knot of persons, interacting solely with one another, bound by powerful feelings of loyalty and of separateness from the rest of society.
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